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A NEW PARADIGM FOR 
STATE CORPORATION LAWS 
WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR.† AND AMBER A. HOUGH†† 
 
“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act (Act), found in 
Section 10-35 of the North Dakota Century Code, has been described in 
news reports as “the first corporate governance ‘shareholder-friendly’ law 
in the nation.”2  As this Article discusses, that statement accurately summa-
rizes the nature of the Act’s provisions as they relate to the major topics in 
the current corporate governance debate, such as majority voting, proxy 
access, reimbursement of proxy contest expenses, “say on pay,” separation 
of the roles of chair of the board and chief executive officer, and limitations 
on poison pills.3  But the Act also needs to be understood as not simply a 
collection of piecemeal shareholder protections but rather as proposing a 
new paradigm for state corporation laws. 
In addition to reviewing many of the specific provisions of the Act 
itself, this Article argues that the Act represents a two-fold fundamental 
change in the way state corporation statutes address corporate governance.  
The first and most important fundamental change is to shift the entire 
paradigm of how directors and boards are monitored and elected by the 
shareholders to a system of contemporaneous oversight.4  The Act shifts 
away from the current system of monitoring the performance of directors in 
a reactionary manner, largely in the context of change of control transac-
tions or wrongdoing, where oversight comes mostly through the courts, in 
 
†Mr. Clark is a Partner in Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP and President of the North Dakota 
Corporate Governance Council.  He was the principal drafter of the North Dakota Publicly Traded 
Corporations Act. 
††Amber Hough is an Associate at Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. 
1. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
2. Crystal R. Reid, Corporate Landscape Changing, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, May 6, 2007, 
available at http://www.bismarcktribune.com/articles/2007/05/06/news/local/132998.txt. 
3. See discussion infra Part III (explaining the provisions of the North Dakota Publicly 
Traded Corporations Act). 
4. See discussion infra Parts III.E & IV (examining the Act’s impact on the oversight and 
election of directors and board members). 
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favor of a system that reinvigorates the shareholder franchise which should 
result in greater accountability of directors to the constituency that elects 
them.5  The fundamental approach of the Act is that monitoring the perfor-
mance of the board of directors should come through open, responsive 
annual elections rather than litigation or proxy contests. 
The second fundamental change made by the Act is to create an 
instantly identifiable corporate governance “brand,” thereby allowing the 
market to “price” the corporation’s governance structure in a way that has 
not previously been possible.  The Act accomplishes this “branding” by 
requiring a corporation to either opt in or out of being subject to all of the 
provisions of the Act, and thus prohibiting a corporation from cherry-
picking among the Act’s provisions.6  This is a departure from all existing 
state corporate codes which, regardless of their general structure, allow 
corporations to opt out of many provisions by simply including appropriate 
provisions in the company charter or bylaws.  By making the Act an 
invariable set of rules, a potential investor in a North Dakota corporation 
subject to the Act will know without any further research that the corpo-
ration has elected a progressive and shareholder friendly structure.  That 
clear communication of a corporation’s governance structure should permit 
the market to price the corporation’s governance structure in a way that 
typical state codes do not allow. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the evolution of 
United States corporation law with a focus on how that history highlights 
the unique nature of the Act.7  Part III introduces the existing North Dakota 
Business Corporations Act (NDBCA)8 and discusses in detail the key 
corporate governance provisions of the Act.9  The discussion in Part III also 
 
5. See generally William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s 
Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 64-76 (2009) (arguing that Delaware is in fact an 
increasingly complicated place to incorporate thanks to inconsistent judicial decisions); Ehud 
Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1908, 1913-19 (1998) (discussing Delaware’s heavy dependency on the courts to moderate 
and make more determinate the state’s very indeterminate corporate code). 
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-03 (2007). 
7. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the history of corporate law in the United States).  
Much has been written about the competition among the states to attract corporate chartering 
business and does not need to be repeated here except to the extent it helps frame the paradigm 
shifts represented by the Act.  See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The 
Market for Corporate Law 162, J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 137 (2006); 
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, passim (2006); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, passim (1974); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, 
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, passim 
(1977). 
8. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-19.1 (1985). 
9. See discussion infra Part III (exploring the key provisions of the Act). 
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provides a brief legislative history of the Act and includes a comparison of 
the key governance provisions of the Act to the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act (Model Act) and the General Corporation law of the State of 
Delaware (Delaware GCL).10  Part IV concludes the discussion and returns 
to the theme that the Act shifts shareholder influence on corporate gover-
nance from a reactive and illusory right, to a proactive and vital system.11 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. CORPORATION LAW 
A. INTRODUCTION:  THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS GENERALLY 
As a matter of legal theory, shareholders own their corporation and the 
directors they elect represent the interests of the shareholders as the direc-
tors manage or supervise the corporation’s affairs.12  Within that frame-
work, the issue becomes how the shareholders can ensure that management 
works for the best interests of the shareholders while at the same time 
allowing management to run the company in the most profitable fashion.  
Or, stated negatively, when shareholders are not happy with the way 
management is running the company, what can the shareholders do about 
it?  Business leaders, academics and shareholders have long debated how to 
address this inherent tension in the corporate structure.13  The traditional 
answer has been twofold.  First, shareholders who are unhappy with the 
management of a corporation can sell their shares and walk away.14  Sec-
ondly, from a purely structural perspective, “[i]f the stockholders are 
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of 
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”15 
In practice, however, both of the answers to the separation between 
ownership and control in the corporate structure have proven illusory.  The 
ability to liquidate a position and invest in a different corporation—the so-
called “Wall Street Walk”—is increasingly difficult for institutional 
 
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2001); COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, MODEL BUSINESS 
CORPORATIONS ACT, OFFICIAL TEXT WITH OFFICIAL COMMENT AND STATUTORY CROSS 
REFERENCES REVISED THROUGH DECEMBER 2007 (American Bar Association 2008). 
11. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the impact the Act has on shareholder influence). 
12. See J. Bradford DeLong, The Corporation as a Command Economy (1997), http://www. 
j-bradford-delong.net/Econ_Articles/Command_Corporations.html (last visited May 13, 2009) 
(giving a concise outline of the legal structure of corporations). 
13. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace and World 1967) (1932).  Berle and Gardiner were 
among the first to outline the problems with management-friendly state codes. 
14. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985); Blasius Indus., Inc. 
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
15. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 959. 
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investors thanks to self-imposed limitations on the type of investments a 
fund can make, or because the size of an institution’s holdings renders its 
shares illiquid in the market, leaving the institution few if any other choices 
for alternate investments.16  Under the current paradigm, in cases where 
walking away is not an option, shareholders have “the powers of corporate 
democracy . . . at their disposal” only if they are willing to incur the sub-
stantial costs of a proxy contest.17  For shareholders who are not interested 
in acquiring control of a corporation, the prospect of mounting a proxy 
contest raises an insurmountable “free rider” problem:  Why should one 
shareholder incur the costs of a proxy contest that will benefit all of the 
shareholders?18  The task is made more difficult because shareholder power 
to bring a proxy contest can be, and often is, reduced in various ways 
including:  advance notice requirements; denying shareholders access to the 
corporation’s proxy statement; and the use of staggered elections to dilute 
shareholder influence over the composition of the board.19  Indeed, one 
commentator believes, “[shareholder voting rights are] so weak that they 
scarcely qualify as part of corporate governance.”20  Other than mounting a 
proxy contest, modern corporation laws do not provide shareholders who 
are not seeking control with any effective means to exercise their theoretical 
powers of corporate democracy. 
 
16. Aaron Bernstein, Shareholder Power: A Look at the Rise of Activist Shareholders, 
DIRECTORSHIP BOARDROOM INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.directorship.com/power-
to-the-shareholders (last visited May 13, 2009). 
17. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 959. 
18. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 passim (1980); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and 
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 114-15 (1965).  When one shareholder 
carries the costs of a proxy contest, all the shareholders benefit from the outcome but none of 
them were required to support the contest financially, thereby becoming “free-riders” to the 
contest benefits. 
19. See generally WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., UPDATING YOUR COMPANY’S CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES—LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, 
EVALUATING POSSIBLE RISKS, AND TAILORING POLICIES TO FIT THE NEEDS OF VARIOUS 
COMPANIES passim (2008) (outlining how the NDBCA works and how it might effect the corpo-
rate governance world in the next several years); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 843-75 (2005) [hereinafter Increasing Shareholder 
Power] (describing in detail the arguments for and against codifying the various shareholder 
protections listed above); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 675, 688 (2007) [hereinafter Myth of the Shareholder Franchise] (describing in detail why 
the current system of corporate governance prohibits meaningful shareholder participation). 
20. Steven Levingston, Icahn, Time Warner End Fight; Dissident Investor Won’t Seek 
Control, WASH. POST, at 413, Feb. 18, 2006. 
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B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE CORPORATION LAWS 
The structuring of corporate laws to limit shareholder influence is no 
accident.  The trend of enticing companies to domicile within a state by 
enacting flexible, manager friendly codes has been common practice since 
the 1890s, generally with great success for the state that enacted such 
codes.21  States, starting with West Virginia in 1888, hypothesized that 
significant sums of tax revenue could be gained if the state was an attractive 
domicile for the then-burgeoning corporate population.22  The states accom-
plished the goal of revenue enhancement by drafting codes that allowed for 
such innovative actions as allowing alterations to the business, amendments 
to the charter, changes to capital structures, and opening the door for 
combining companies—thereby creating the merger.23  More importantly 
for the current discussion, the new codes also expressed for the first time 
that the management and control of a corporation would rest in a board of 
directors rather than the shareholders.24  This, the states believed, would 
attract corporations because the board decides where to domicile the com-
pany, and they would naturally choose a state which gave them the greatest 
amount of flexibility.25  This theory proved to be a success both for corpo-
rations and for the states.  For corporations, not only did the less restrictive 
codes allow companies the kind of flexibility they needed to evolve and 
grow; New Jersey and, in quick succession, many other states—most 
notably the bellwether state of Delaware—found that this type of liberal 
corporate code attracted sufficient corporate activity and tax revenue to 
keep the states completely in the black.26  This trend continues today.  
Every state has a more or less liberal, manager friendly code designed to 
entice managers to domicile their business in that particular state or to not 
leave the state for a more hospitable jurisdiction.27 
 
21. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 7, at 626-29 (providing an overview of competitive 
state charters starting in 1888). 
22. Id. at 627. 
23. Id. 
24. JAMES B. DILL, THE STATUTORY AND CASE LAW APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE COMPANIES 
UNDER THE GENERAL CORPORATIONS ACT OF NEW JERSEY 42-43 (1898). 
25. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1784, 1803 (2006) (arguing that this board-friendly approach is harmful and shareholders should 
have more direct say in the state of incorporation or reincorporation of a company); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice, 87 VA. L. REV. 
993, 997 (2001) (discussing the distortion that occurs when boards decide where to incorporate). 
26. RALPH NADER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION:  THE CASE FOR THE 
FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 45 (1976). 
27. See generally Mark J. Roe, Does Delaware Compete?, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1315342 (discussing generally the trend towards 
liberal codes and Delaware’s attempts to stay the most popular state for incorporation); Bar-Gill, 
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Despite the clear trend to enact corporate charters without shareholder 
protections, the question of whether that is the best public policy has long 
been strenuously debated.28  As early as 1932, economists Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means described how these flexible codes could ultimately be 
detrimental to the shareholder owners of corporations, because the codes 
fail to police problems with competence and responsibility among man-
agers.29  This argument has been echoed and expanded on over the years as 
the tension between shareholders and directors has increased.  In 1974, 
Professor William Cary, former chair of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, first articulated a theory he called the “race to the bottom,” 
which expanded on Berle and Means’ theory.30  He argued that the obvious 
upshot of codes like Delaware, which expressly allow for anyone including 
directors to elect the state of incorporation,31 was that the decision was 
effectively being made by the managers.32  He posited that since Delaware, 
in order to increase its revenues from franchise taxes, crafted their corporate 
laws to favor managers and entice them to incorporate in Delaware, other 
states would try to draft even more manager friendly codes.33  This creates a 
“race to the bottom” competition between states that amplifies the move 
towards liberal codes exponentially and ultimately results in poor corporate 
codes across the nation law that blindly favor managers over shareholders.34 
Another approach to concerns over the trend toward manager friendly 
state codes came in a response to Cary’s “race to the bottom” theory.35  
Judge Ralph Winter, in a 1977 article, argued for a theory he called the 
“race to the top.”36  According to Winter, states would offer shareholder 
friendly, more limited corporate laws because these types of codes would 
 
Barzuza & Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 136-56 (discussing generally the trend towards liberal codes 
and why states such as Delaware become dominant). 
28. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 7, at 619. 
29. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, passim. 
30. Cary, supra note 7, at 666. 
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2001). 
32. Cary, supra note 7, at 705. 
33. Id. at 666. 
34. Id. at 663-66. 
35. Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977) (refuting Cary’s proposition on and suggesting an alternate 
theory). 
36. Id.; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on 
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 N.W. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982) 
(using the phrase “climb to the top”).  For another possibility, namely that state competition 
produces a “race to the top” in some issues and a “race to the bottom” in others, see Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (1992).  See also Bar-Gill, Barzuza & Bebchuk, 
supra note 7, at 137. 
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maximize the value of corporations. 37  Winter argued that if a state unduly 
favors managers, the value of corporations incorporated in the state would 
eventually decrease.38  If the value of a corporation decreased, either the 
corporation would be taken over while at this vulnerable devalued state or 
become bankrupt by the higher cost of capital it would face.39  Thus, Winter 
posited that states have an interest in promoting shareholder friendly 
corporate laws in order to keep the value of the corporations incorporated in 
their state valuable and stable, and in turn encourage more corporations to 
incorporate under their code.40 
For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to resolve the debate 
over whether the states are engaged in a race to the bottom or a race to the 
top.  Regardless of the nature of the race, what is clear is that state law 
based changes in corporate governance are coming largely from two 
sources, the shareholders and the courts.41  Over the last several years, 
shareholder friendly changes have been made in record numbers.42  But 
those changes have occurred in a slow, piece-meal process as stockholders 
have agitated for discrete changes through the shareholder proposal process 
or through litigation—particularly in major corporate transactions.43  This 
manner of effecting change has been detrimental both to shareholders and 
to the corporations they target because it raises costs and, particularly in the 
 




41. See Jay W. Eisenhofer & Greg S. Levin, Does Corporate Governance Matter to 
Investment Returns?, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, Sept. 23, 2005, at 930 (“[T]he 
quality of a particular company’s governance practices and procedures positively correlates with 
both good corporate financial performance and stockholder value.”). 
42. See 2008 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 4 (2008), available at http:// 
www.georgesonshareholder.com/usa/acgr08.php (summarizing proxy results and corporate gov-
ernance proposals for 2008). 
43. See generally Vincent R. Cappucci, Shareholder Activism and the Use of Litigation to 
Accomplish Investment Goals, FUND MANAGEMENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY REPORT (2006), 
available at http://www.entwistle-law.com/news/publications/000019/_res/id=sa_File1/share 
holder%20activism.pdf (discussing the rising trend of using litigation by shareholders to force 
corporate changes); Emily Heller, Investors Press Their Demands: The Path to Power in the 
Boardroom May Pass Through the Courtroom, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/MediaMentions/10-09-
06_NLJ.pdf (considering the use of litigation by shareholders to gain governance control rather 
than to police bad behavior); Lin Peng & Alisa Roell, Executive Pay and Shareholder Litigation, 
12 OXFORD REV. OF FIN. J. 141, 158-70 (2007), available at http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/ 
cgi/content/full/12/1/141 (addressing the effects of executive compensation on securities 
litigation); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 136-37 (2005) (discussing litigation 
used traditionally as a check on managerial misconduct and the increase in suits focusing on 
management control in acquisitions and mergers). 
         
1066 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1059 
case of litigation, the outcomes are inherently uncertain.44  It has created a 
patchwork for fact-based rulings that minimalize the very strengths of an 
indeterminate and flexible code.45  As a result, corporations are less effi-
cient and consistency in corporate governance becomes even more 
difficult.46 
Seen against this background, the significance of what North Dakota 
has done becomes clear.  Instead of forcing shareholder activists to seek 
piecemeal corporate reform, the Act enables a corporation, which chooses 
to be subject to the Act, to change its entire corporate structure in one step.  
By subjecting directors to meaningful annual elections, the Act should 
significantly reduce the need for litigation to police the performance of 
directors because the directors will be more attuned to the opinions of the 
shareholders and the value of the corporation.47  Shifting governance to a 
system based on the rights conferred by the Act, and less on state court 
litigation, will save both shareholders and corporations in the long run as it 
will avoid the “omnipresent risk of liability” engendered by the 
indeterminacy of court made law. 48 
 
44. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998) [hereinafter Regulatory Competition Theory] (arguing that 
by having to rely on “ad hoc judicial interpretation” of “crudely defined guidelines for managerial 
behavior” liberal corporate codes create costs and uncertainty); Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litiga-
tion Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 891-96 (1999) [hereinafter 
Shareholder Litigation] (describing how continual litigation raises costs to corporations, creates 
cost uncertainty, and leaves corporations without certainty as to how the courts will come out on 
certain issues). 
45. See Regulatory Competition Theory, supra note 44, 1913-23 (pointing out Delaware 
gives itself an even greater advantage because it combines the indeterminate code that requires 
judicial interpretation with the most developed business judiciary in the nation); Shareholder 
Litigation, supra note 44, at 891-96 (arguing that American corporate law relies heavily on open-
ended court decisions in resolving corporate disputes, in doing so deprives corporate actions of 
bright line rules, and instead creates inconclusive and ultimately costly and inconsistent criteria 
for behavior).  Since corporations know they will need such interpretation, they go to Delaware 
where the process is more developed.  Regulatory Competition Theory, supra note 44, at 1913-23.  
Delaware thereby gives itself a competitive advantage.  Id. 
46. Shareholder Litigation, supra note 44, at 891-96. 
47. Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 19, at 865-75. 
48. Shareholder Litigation, supra note 44, at 899; see also Joshua D. Fulop, Agency Costs 
and the Strike Suit: Reducing Frivolous Litigation Through Empowerment of Shareholders, 7 J. 
BUS. & SEC. L. 213, 214 (2007) (discussing the costs of shareholder litigation and arguing that a 
code-based set of shareholder rights will significantly decrease costs and be a better tool for 
corporate oversight than shareholder suits). 
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III. NORTH DAKOTA LAW AND THE ACT 
All corporations incorporated in North Dakota are subject to the 
NDBCA.49  The NDBCA is the general business code for incorporation and 
management of corporations in North Dakota.50  While the NDBCA has 
been periodically amended to address the evolving concerns of businesses, 
including a restatement in 1985, it is a manager friendly code just like the 
laws in other states.51  The NDBCA allows great latitude in drafting the 
charter and bylaws, and does not protect shareholder rights in a manner any 
different from that in other states.52 
Since the NDBCA applies generally to all corporations domiciled in 
North Dakota, the Act is designed to work in tandem with, and expand on, 
the NDBCA.53  The first four sections of the Act (Sections 10-35-01, 10-35-
02, 10-35-03 and 10-35-04) describe the relationship between the NDBCA 
and the Act, and specify which corporations are subject to the Act.54  Sec-
tion 10-35-02 provides that a “corporation” or “publicly traded corporation” 
(as defined in the Act) will be subject to the Act if: (i) it becomes governed 
by the NDBCA after July 1, 2007; and (ii) its articles of incorporation state 
that the corporation is governed by the Act.55  Thus, any company incor-
porating in North Dakota after July 1, 2007 may choose to be governed by 
the Act and the NDBCA or by the NDBCA only.56  Similarly, a corporation 
can choose to cease to be subject to the Act by amending its charter to 
remove the reference to the Act. 57  Section 10-35-03(3) provides that if a 
corporation does elect to be subject to the Act, all of the provisions of the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation and bylaws must be consistent with 
the Act.58  The first four sections of the Act require it to be taken as a whole 
 
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-04 (1985). 
50. Id. 
51. See discussion infra Part III.A-K. 
52. See discussion infra Part III.A-K. 
53. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-04 (2007) (confirming the duel applications of the 
NDBCA of the Act; specifying that the definitions found in Chapter 10-19.1 are applicable to the 
Act; and stating that where the Act has been elected and its terms vary from the terms of the 
NDBCA, the provisions of the Act control). 
54. Id. §§ 10-35-01 to -04. 
55. Id. § 10-35-02(6).  A “Publicly traded corporation” is defined as “a corporation as de-
fined in Section 10-19.1-01: (a) that becomes governed by Chapter 10-19.1 after July 1, 2007; and 
(b) the articles of which state that the corporation is governed by this chapter.”  Id. 
56. Id. 
57. See id. § 10-35-03(1) (“[T]his chapter applies only to a publicly traded corporation 
meeting the definition of a ‘publicly traded corporation’ in section 10-35-02 during such time as 
its articles state that it is governed by this chapter.”). 
58. Id. § 10-35-03(3). 
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and create the “branding” aspect of the Act.59  This provides investors 
buying shares in a corporation subject to the Act with the knowledge that 
the shares carry with them all of the substantive rules found in the Act 
regarding the corporate governance of the corporation. 
Sections 10-35-05 through 10-35-27 of the Act set forth the specific 
changes and additions to the NDBCA that give shareholders the substantive 
protections and rights that make the Act unique.60  The following discussion 
highlights the most important of these sections for shareholder participation 
and compares and contrasts them with not only the underlying NDBCA, but 
also with the Delaware GCL and the Model Act.61 
A. SECTION 10-35-05:  AMENDMENT OF THE BYLAWS 
Section 10-35-05 of the Act permits any shareholder to propose the 
adoption, amendment or repeal of a bylaw, and expressly prohibits amend-
ing the articles of incorporation or bylaws to impose additional require-
ments on proposals by shareholders to amend the bylaws.62  This overrides 
Section 10-19.1-31 of the NDBCA, which limits the right of shareholders to 
make such proposals to shareholders who own 5% or more of a company’s 
outstanding shares, but allows for the bylaws to impose stiffer requirements 
for proposing an amendment if desired.63  Section 10-35-05 of the Act 
brings North Dakota more closely in line with Section 109 of the Delaware 
GCL, which grants “the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws” to the 
“stockholders entitled to vote.”64  Section 10-35-05 also brings North 
Dakota more closely in line with Section 10.20 of the Model Act, which 
similarly allows for amendment of the bylaws at the proposal of the 
shareholders.65 
B. SECTION 10-35-06:  BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Section 10-35-06 limits the term a board member may serve; requires 
all board members to stand for election at the same time; limits the ways in 
which the size of a board may be changed; and limits who may serve as the 
 
59. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. 
60. See discussion infra Part III.A-K. 
61. See discussion infra Part III.A-K. 
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-05.  Section 10-35-05(1) grants the right to propose 
amendments and Section 10-35-05(2) reverses the otherwise applicable Section 10-19.1-31(3)(c) 
of the NDBCA expressly allowing for alterations. 
63. Id. § 10-19.1-31 (1985). 
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2001). 
65. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (2008). 
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chair of the board.66  Section 10-35-06(1), prohibiting board member terms 
of more than one year, is a significant departure from NDBCA Section 10-
19.1-35(1) which permits either an indefinite term or, if provided in the 
articles or bylaws, a fixed term of up to five years.67  Section 10-35-06(2) of 
the Act, prohibiting staggered board member terms, reverses the rule in 
Section 10-19.1-35(2) of the NDBCA, which follows the Delaware GCL 
and the Model Act, and permits staggered boards.68  The result of Sections 
10-35-06(1) and (2) of the Act is that every director of a publicly traded 
corporation must be elected each year.69 
Staggered elections of directors are an impediment to a successful 
challenge to an incumbent board in several ways.  First, having to challenge 
board members at two separate elections, at least a year apart, will increase 
the costs of a challenge.70  Secondly, if the first challenge is successful, the 
staggered election leads to an interim period where members of both the 
incumbent and challenger slates sit on the board and internal divisions and 
friction are likely to occur.71  Therefore, many shareholders are reluctant to 
vote for a year of friction regardless of the merit of the challenge.  Lastly, 
removing the possibility of staggered boards reduces the potency of poison 
pill provisions because a staggered board delays any takeover for as long as 
a majority of the board members against the takeover are in place.72  
Depending on the terms, the takeover could be delayed several years.73  If 
the entire board is elected each year, the shareholders could use the election 
on a referendum, elect a new board, and stop the board from further 
blocking the takeover bid.74 
In a similar vein, Section 10-35-06(3) of the Act prohibits corporations 
from changing the size of its board of directors where the board has notice 
that there will be a contested election of directors, or where, pursuant to 
Section 10-35-07, shareholders do not have the right to nominate candidates 
 
66. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-06(1) (2007) (limiting board members’ terms); § 10-35-
06(2) (requiring all board members to stand for election at the same time); § 10-35-06(3) 
(restricting changes in board size); § 10-35-06(4) (limiting who may serve as chair of board). 
67. Compare id. § 10-35-06(1) (prohibiting board member terms over one year), with id. 
§ 10-19.1-35(1) (1985) (permitting indefinite board member terms). 
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06. 
69. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-06(1)-(2). 
70. See Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, supra note 19, at 694 (explaining the structure of 
staggered boards and describing how two elections makes challenging the existing board more 
costly). 
71. Id. 
72. Kevin L. Turner, Settling the Debate: A Response to Professor Bebchuk’s Proposed 
Reform of Hostile Takeover Defenses, 57 ALA. L. REV. 907, 907 (2006). 
73. Id. at 907-08. 
74. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 944 (2002). 
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for election at the next regular shareholder meeting.75  Consistent with the 
case law in Delaware, Section 10-35-06(3) is intended to prevent manage-
ment or current directors from improperly interfering with an upcoming 
election contest by diluting the power of any single director sitting on the 
board.76 
Finally, Section 10-35-06(4) requires the board of directors to elect a 
chairperson for the board and prohibits the chair from serving as an 
executive officer of the corporation.77  The Delaware GCL is silent on this 
point.  Section 7.08(a) of the Model Act simply provides that there will be a 
chair of the board, but does not impose any restrictions on who may serve 
in that capacity.78 
C. SECTION 10-35-07:  NOMINATION OF DIRECTORS AND NOTICE FOR 
AMENDMENTS 
Section 10-35-07 of the Act prevents corporations from imposing 
burdensome informational requirements on shareholders by limiting the 
scope of what a corporation may require if a shareholder nominates a 
candidate for election as a director.79  This contrasts with the NDBCA, the 
Delaware GCL, and the Model Act, none of which places any limitations on 
the requirements corporations can impose for nominations.  Furthermore, 
Sections 10-35-07(3) and (5) limit how much advance notice a corporation 
may require a shareholder, nominating a candidate for election as a director, 
to provide.80  These requirements are designed to make sure shareholders 
have adequate time to nominate candidates or propose bylaw amendments 
without being hindered by prohibitive early due dates or overly cumber-
some requirements.  Section 10-35-07 also gives shareholders the assurance 
 
75. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-06(3), -07 (2007). 
76. E.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 655 (Del. Ch. 1988) (creating the 
standard of review for when a court can overlook the business judgment rule and review corporate 
board actions when the action is for the primary purpose of impeding or interfering in the 
effectiveness of shareholder votes without a compelling justification); see also MM Companies, 
Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Del. 2003) (where the court found the manage-
ment of a corporation’s expansion the board was expressly to impede the effectiveness of a 
shareholder vote without a compelling justification and therefore was invalid). 
77. “Executive Officer” is defined in Rule 3-B7 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  
The SEC has attempted to implement a similar independent chairman requirement in other 
regulatory areas.  See Release No. IC-26520 (describing Investment Company Act governance 
rule, issued but then reversed, currently under consideration). 
78. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.08(a) (2008). 
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-07. 
80. Id. § 10-35-07(3), (5). 
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that the rules under which they must give notice will not change 
unexpectedly before an annual meeting.81 
D. SECTION 10-35-08:  ACCESS TO THE CORPORATION’S PROXY 
STATEMENT 
Section 10-35-08 of the Act provides that if a shareholder holding at 
least 5% of the shares of a corporation nominates a candidate for director, 
the corporation must include the nomination in the corporation’s proxy 
statement.82  This is one of the core elements of the paradigm shift, 
allowing for greater and more direct shareholder oversight and pro-active 
influence over the action of the members of the board.  It is also one of the 
places where the Act most fundamentally departs from other corporate 
codes.  The Delaware GCL, the Model Act, and the NDBCA do not give a 
shareholder the right to include nominations in the corporation’s proxy 
statement.  As a result, under the Delaware GCL, the Model Act, and the 
NDBCA, a shareholder who wishes to see alternative candidates for elec-
tion as directors must distribute a separate proxy statement.  The absence of 
a right of proxy access creates a huge functional barrier to meaningful 
elections of directors.  The Delaware legislature has amended the Delaware 
GCL, effective August 1, 2009, to allow the bylaws of a corporation to 
require inclusion of shareholder nominees in the corporate proxy 
statement.83  Unlike the NDBCA however, the new Delaware law does not 
require corporations to include shareholder nominations, but simply allows 
corporations to require such inclusion if they choose.84 
Shareholder access to corporate proxy statements has been a hotly 
debated issue since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pro-
posed in 2003 to give shareholders access to the corporate proxy state-
ment.85  Although the SEC’s proposal has been on hold for several years, 
the language of Section 10-35-08 of the Act is patterned after portions of 
 
81. Id. § 10-35-07(5).  Similar provisions apply under Section 10-35-14 of the Act to 
shareholder proposals of business at a regular meeting. 
82. Id. § 10-35-08. 
83. Del. Code Ann. TIT. 8, § 112.  
84. Id. 
85.  Proposed Rules: Securities and Exchange Commission, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,819 et 
seq. (Oct. 23, 2003); Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626, 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101 (Oct. 14, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/34-48626.htm; see also Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l 
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 124 (2006) (holding that the SEC regulations do give the shareholders 
of AFSCME the right to access to amend the bylaws to allow for shareholder-nominated 
candidates to be included on the corporate ballot as such action does “relate to an election”). 
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the SEC’s 2003 proposal.86  Section 10-35-08(1) gives a shareholder, or 
group of shareholders, who have held 5% of a publicly traded corporation 
for two years, the right to include a candidate nomination directly in the 
corporation’s proxy statement.87  The right to proxy access is limited to 5% 
shareholders who have held shares for two years to avoid frivolous 
additions to the proxy statement and to stop new purchasers from using 
access to the proxy statement as a takeover tool. 
The right of shareholders to have access to the corporate proxy 
statement has been considered on the federal level since as early as 1942 
when the SEC debated adopting such a proposal.88  The debate has con-
tinued on the federal level with subsequent discussions on the issue in 1977, 
1992, and 2003.89  Most recently, the SEC has approved a new proposal 
which, although the actual rule has not yet been promulgated, may require 
corporate proxy statements to be opened to shareholders.90  The proposal, 
although not yet final, is already drawing sharp criticism.91  Some of the 
arguments against shareholder access echo the reoccurring themes:  that 
directors have a duty of care to the shareholders so it is unnecessary as they 
will vote in the shareholder’s interest; that shareholders may do the Wall 
Street walk if they are unsatisfied; or that shareholders or special interest 
groups, with no duty towards the corporation would nominate candidates 
 
86. Specifically, Section 10-35-08(1) is patterned after proposed SEC Rule 14a-11(a), and 
Sections 10-35-08(2)(c), (d), and (e) are patterned after proposed SEC Rules 14a-11(c)(1), (8), and 
(7) respectively.  68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,819 et seq.; Security Holder Director Nominations, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, (Oct. 14, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm.  The most significant differences 
between Section 10-35-08 and the SEC proposal are that the SEC proposal would give 
shareholders the right to include only a limited number of nominees and would only apply after 
certain triggering events had occurred.  Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08, with 68 Fed. Reg. 
60,784, 60,819 et seq.; Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
48626, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08(1).  Setting a minimum ownership requirement for 
shareholders who are permitted access to the corporation’s proxy statement is desirable to prevent 
the corporation’s ballot from being overrun by candidates nominated by “fringe” investors.  
Additionally, the two-year minimum holding requirement is intended to limit access to 
shareholders who are focused on long-term rather than short-term value. 
88. Lewis J. Sundquist III, Proposal to Allow Shareholder Nomination of Corporate 
Directors: Overreaction in Times of Corporate Scandal, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1471, 1474 
(2004). 
89. Id. 
90. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Votes to Propose Rule 
Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009) 
(providing an overview of the as-yet-to-be-proposed new rules) available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2009/2009-116.htm (last visited May 26, 2009). 
91. Strategies for the New Reality of Shareholder Proxy Access, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz (2009) (reiterating the firm’s opposition to proxy access and outlining various approaches to 
draft bylaws to avoid the most stringent aspects of what the SEC may propose), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/05/14/. 
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solely for their own benefit rather than the benefit of the corporation as a 
whole.92  Proponents of proxy access point to:  the functional difficulties of 
liquidating shares; the duty of care which has not kept directors in line 
historically; limits on access including the 5% of shareholders rule; and 
reimbursing only successful proxy bids limits special interest proxy actions 
by shareholders.93 
E. SECTION 10-35-09:  ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 
Section 10-35-09 of the Act requires majority voting in the election of 
directors unless the corporation has cumulative voting.94  This is one place 
where the Act permits a choice by a corporation.  Shareholders traditionally 
have preferred cumulative voting to plurality voting, but recently share-
holders have begun to favor majority voting.  Cumulative and majority 
voting is permissible under the Act, but plurality voting is not. 95  If share-
holders are not entitled to vote cumulatively, then they must vote “yes,” 
“no,” or “abstain” on each candidate.  Both the NDBCA and the North 
Dakota Constitution default to a system of cumulative voting “unless other-
wise provided in the articles of incorporation.”96  Under cumulative voting, 
each shareholder votes in favor of candidates or withholds their votes.97  
Those candidates receiving the highest number of votes, up to the number 
of positions to be filled, are elected.98  In order to be elected, a nominee 
must receive at least fifty percent of “yes” votes.  This is in contrast with 
plurality voting where a director may be elected by as little as one vote.99 
Changing the electoral system is an issue that corporations and 
shareholders have been increasingly addressing on a company-by-company 
basis.  Since 2004, more than two-thirds of the corporations in the S&P 500 
have adopted provisions similar to the ones codified by Section 10-35-09 of 
the Act.100  Shareholder activists seek to change the current system from a 
plurality or cumulative system to a majority system for two reasons:  (1) to 
 
92. Id. at 1490-96. 
93. Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 37, 
48-61 (1990); Jeff Kominsky, Access Granted: Proxies and the SEC, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 573, 573 (2007); see also Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 19, at 836-912 
(describing in detail each of these issues and how increased shareholder access to proxy helps 
these issues). 
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-09 (2007). 
95. Id. § 10-35-09(2)(a). 
96. N.D. CONST. art. XII, §6; N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-39 (1985). 
97. Barnard, supra note 93, at 46-49. 
98. Id. 
99. Joshua R. Mourning, The Majority-Voting Movement: Curtailing Shareholder 
Disenfranchisement in Corporate Director Elections, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 1143, 1160 (2007). 
100. 2008 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW, supra note 42, at 6. 
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provide shareholders an effective means to express their displeasure with a 
nominee; and (2) the existing system can result in a candidate being elected 
a board director with as few as one affirmative vote.  Under the Act if a 
majority vote results in not all the vacant director positions filled, the board 
may not appoint to the board an individual who has been voted on and not 
elected, nor may any former director not reelected continue as director past 
the end of his or her term for more than 90 days.101 
F. SECTION 10-35-10:  REIMBURSEMENT OF PROXY EXPENSES 
Section 10-35-10(1) of the Act requires reimbursement of a share-
holder’s proxy expenses, if the shareholder nominates a candidate not 
supported by management or the board, and that director is elected.102  The 
amount of reimbursement is tied to the success of the shareholder in having 
alternative candidates elected.103  Shareholders do not automatically have 
this right under the Model Act, NDBCA, Delaware GCL, or any other state 
law.  However, the Delaware GCL has been amended, effective August 1, 
2009, to permit a corporation to provide in the bylaws for the 
reimbursement of such expenses.104  Under Section 10-35-10(1), if a 
shareholder nominates four candidates and three are elected, the shareholder 
will be reimbursed for 75% of the shareholder’s expenses in bringing the 
challenge.105  The expenses that will be reimbursed include amounts paid to 
third parties relating to the solicitation, including lawyers, proxy solicitors, 
public relations firms, printers, and media outlets.106  Expense 
reimbursement is tied to success in a proxy contest so that compensation is 
limited to shareholders that actively participate in corporate governance 
measures while not rewarding frivolous challenges expected to receive only 
little support.107 
Under the current system in other states the proxy expenses of the cor-
poration are paid for by the corporation, but a shareholder mounting a proxy 
contest must pay its own expenses even if successful.108  Therefore, the 
current system is significantly tilted in favor of incumbent management.  
Not surprisingly then, reimbursement has been a heated debate within the 
 
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-09(2)(d) (2007); see generally Mourning, supra note 99, at 
1169-86 (discussing the pros and cons of majority-voting issue and a detailed discussion of the 
history of the movement to have majority-voting implemented). 
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-10(1). 
103. Id. 
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113.   
105. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-10(1). 
106. Id. § 10-35-10(2). 
107. See Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, supra note 19, at 688. 
108. See Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 19, at 856. 
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corporate and academic community, because the costs to shareholders for 
an unreimbursed proxy contest average in the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars for each contest.109 
G. SECTION 10-35-11:  SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS PROHIBITED 
Section 10-35-11 of the Act prohibits supermajority voting require-
ments for both boards and shareholders.110  This is in direct contrast to the 
Model Act, Delaware GCL, and NDBCA, each of which permit superma-
jority voting requirements.111  Section 10-35-11(1) provides that a simple 
majority of the full board constitutes a quorum, and a majority of the votes 
cast at a meeting is sufficient to take action.112  Section 10-35-11(2) simi-
larly provides that the presence of a majority of the shareholders entitled to 
vote constitutes a quorum, and a majority of the votes cast is sufficient for 
the shareholders to take action.113 
H. SECTION 10-35-12:  REGULAR MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
1. Regular Meetings 
Sections 10-35-12(1) and (2) of the Act require a publicly traded cor-
poration to hold a shareholding meeting annually and to fix in its articles or 
bylaws the latest date by which the corporation’s regular meeting must be 
held each year.114  This is in contrast to NDBCA Section 10-19.1-71, which 
provides that “regular meetings of shareholders may be held on an annual 
or other less frequent periodic basis but need not be held unless required by 
the articles or bylaws.”115  Under the Act, if a meeting has not occurred by 
the set date, Section 10-35-12(3) gives shareholders the right to demand a 
regular meeting of shareholders, or apply for a court order directing the 
shareholder meeting to be held.116  In each case, the shareholder’s right is 
 
109. Id. 
110. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-11. 
111. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.27, 8.24 (2008) (expressly allowing the articles of 
incorporation to provide for greater than majority voting for shareholders (Section 7.27) and 
directors (Section 8.23)); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 216 (2001) (allowing the certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws to specify greater than majority voting for shareholders (Section 216) and 
directors (Section 141)); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-19.1-46, -74 (1985) (sections 46 and 74 of the 
NDBCA have identical flexibility to allow for a supermajority voting). 
112. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-11(1) (2007). 
113. Id. § 10-35-11(2). 
114. Id.§ 10-35-12(1), (2). 
115. Id. § 10-19.1-71 (1985). 
116. Id. § 10-35-12(3) (2007). 
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without regard to the percentage of voting power held by that 
shareholder.117  This is in contrast to Section 10-19.1-71(2) of the NDBCA, 
which limits the right to demand a meeting to shareholders with a 5% or 
more interest.118  Section 10-35-12 of the Act is similar to Section 
7.03(a)(2) of the Model Act, which permits a shareholder to petition a court 
to order an annual meeting if one has not occurred within six months after 
the end of the corporation’s fiscal year or within fifteen months after the 
last meeting, and Section 211(c) of the Delaware GCL, under which any 
shareholder may petition for a court-ordered annual meeting thirteen 
months after the last annual meeting has passed.119 
2. Executive Compensation 
An issue that has been in the news recently and creates perhaps the 
most obvious public ire in regard to corporate governance is that of execu-
tive compensation.120  To address concerns that boards are setting compen-
sation at irresponsibly high levels, Section 10-35-12(5) requires the board 
committee that sets executive compensation to report to the shareholders at 
each regular shareholder meeting.121  At each regular shareholder meeting, 
shareholders entitled to vote for the election of directors are also entitled to 
vote, on an advisory basis, on whether they accept the report of the compen-
sation committee.122  An advisory vote requirement on executive compensa-
tion is not found in either the Model Act or the Delaware GCL, but is 
required under the laws of the United Kingdom.123  A bill was introduced in 
the U.S. House of Representatives in 2007 that would have required the 
type of nonbinding vote on compensation that the Act requires.124  
Although the bill did not ultimately pass, the idea was originally cham-
 
117. Subsection 3 adopts the rule in Section 211(c) of the Delaware GCL, which permits any 
stockholder to demand a delinquent annual meeting.  See NewCastle Partners, L.P. v. Vesta Ins. 
Group, Inc., 887 A.2d 975, 981-2 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding that the Delaware provision does not 
necessarily create an insurmountable conflict with the SEC proxy rules); see also N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 10-35-05(1) (making a similar change with respect to proposing amendments to the 
bylaws). 
118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-71(2) (1985). 
119. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.03(a)(2) (2008). 
120. See Edward Labaton & Ethan Wohl, Selective “Say-on-Pay” the Best Remedy, EXECU-
TIVE COUNSEL, Nov./Dec. 2008, at 18 (discussing the “say-on-pay” movement and concluding 
shareholders will continue to try to gain greater control over executive compensation). 
121. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-12(5) (2007). 
122. Id. 
123. COMPANIES ACT 2006, ch. 46 § 439; see also Increasing Shareholder Power, supra 
note 23, at 848-50. 
124. Kara Scannell & Siobhan Hughes, House Clears an Executive-Pay Measure, WALL 
STREET J., Apr. 21, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117709548923877174. 
html. 
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pioned by then-Senator Obama and has become part of the Democratic 
Party platform, and thus, is likely to continue to be a hot topic in the federal 
area for the foreseeable future.125 
I. SECTION 10-35-13:  CALL OF SPECIAL MEETING OF 
SHAREHOLDERS 
Section 10-35-13 permits shareholders holding at least 10% of the 
outstanding shares to demand a special meeting of shareholders at any time, 
and for any purpose.126  The Act differs from the corresponding NDBCA 
Section 10-19.1-72, which permits the holders of at least 10% of the votes, 
entitled to be cast on an issue, to call a special meeting of shareholders to 
vote regarding that issue, but limits the ability of shareholders to call a 
meeting to consider a business combination to shareholders owning 25% or 
more of the outstanding shares.127  Section 10-35-13 eliminates the special 
rule for calling a meeting to consider a business combination, with the 
result that 10% of the shares will be able to call a meeting for any purpose.  
Section 10-35-13 is similar to but stricter than Section 7.02 of the Model 
Act, because while the Model Act permits 10% of the shareholders to 
demand a meeting, the Model Act allows that percentage to be raised to 
25% by a provision in the articles of incorporation.128 
J. SECTION 10-35-15:  SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS OF AMENDMENT 
OF THE ARTICLES 
In a manner similar to the limits in Sections 10-35-14 and 10-35-07, 
advance notice requirements a corporation may impose, Sections 10-35-
14(2) and 10-35-15(1) prevent corporations from imposing burdensome 
informational requirements on shareholders exercising their right to propose 
an amendment to the articles.129  Section 10-19.1-19(2) of the NDBCA, 
allows shareholders holding at least 5% of outstanding shares to propose 
 
125. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE, INC., THE 2008 DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY PLATFORM: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 25 (2008), available at http://s3.amazonaws. 
com/apache.3cdn.net/8a738445026d1d5f0f_bcm6b5l7a.pdf. 
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-13 (2007). 
127. Id. § 10-19.1-72 (1985). 
128. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.02 (2008). 
129. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-14(2), 10-35-15(1).  Specifically, Section 10-35-15(1) pro-
hibits a corporation from requiring a shareholder proposal to amend the articles to include more 
than: (a) the name of the shareholder or the names of the members of the group of shareholders; 
(b) a statement of the number of shares of each class owned beneficially or of record by the 
shareholder or group of shareholders and reasonable evidence of that ownership; and (c) the text 
of the proposed amendment.  Id. § 10-35-15(1). 
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amendments to the articles of incorporation.130  What is significant about 
the Act is that Section 10-35-15(3) provides that an amendment to the 
articles proposed by a shareholder and approved by shareholders need not 
be approved by the board to be adopted and become effective.131  This is in 
contrast with Section 10.03 of the Model Act, which expressly requires any 
shareholder proposed amendment to be adopted by the board of directors, 
and puts no limit on the other requirements the board may put on such 
proposals.132  Similarly, Section 242(b)(1) of the Delaware GCL requires 
that all amendments to the certificate of incorporation be approved by the 
board.133 
K. SECTION 10-35-16:  REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVENING 
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS 
A key goal throughout the Act was to make sure shareholders have a 
realistic ability to exercise their corporate governance rights and that those 
rights are not limited or circumvented by logistical difficulties.  Section 10-
35-16 requires corporations to make a public announcement of the date of a 
regular meeting far enough in advance so its shareholders can comply with 
any advance notice requirements adopted under Section 10-35-07 or 10-35-
14.134  Furthermore, Section 10-35-16(1) ensures any announcement of a 
changed meeting date must be easy to find in the body of a public filing 
rather than buried in an attachment.135 
L. SECTION 10-35-17:  APPROVAL OF CERTAIN ISSUANCES OF 
SHARES 
Section 10-35-17 requires that a corporation obtain shareholder 
approval for issuance of shares, or other securities convertible into or rights 
exercisable for shares in a transaction or a series of integrated transactions, 
if the issuance will exceed 20% of the voting power of the shares outstand-
ing immediately before the transaction.136  Many corporations are already 
 
130. Id. § 10-19.1-19(2) (1985). 
131. Id.  § 10-35-15(3) (2007). 
132. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (2008). 
133. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2001). 
134. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-16. 
135. Id. § 10-35-16(1).  This Section expressly addresses the problem presented in Accipiter 
Life Sciences Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, where the announcement was found to be insufficient because 
it was buried in an earnings release. Accipiter Life Sciences Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d 115, 
127 (2006). 
136. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-17.  For purposes of this section, the voting power of 
shares issued and issuable as a result of a transaction or series of integrated transactions shall be 
the greater of: (i) the voting power of the shares to be issued; or (ii) the voting power of the shares 
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subject to this type of requirement because of Section 6.21(f) of the Model 
Act.137  NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange require shareholder 
approval before a corporation may issue shares of more than 20% of the 
outstanding voting power.138  This limitation protects shareholders from 
having their interests watered down by the board issuing additional shares. 
M. SECTION 10-35-19:  CONDUCT AND BUSINESS OF SHAREHOLDER 
MEETINGS 
Section 10-35-19 of the Act, patterned after Section 7.08 of the Model 
Act, provides rules on how shareholder meetings are to be conducted.139  
The Delaware GCL is silent on this matter.  Pursuant to Section 10-35-
19(1), a presiding officer must be present at every shareholder meeting of 
the shareholders of a publicly traded corporation.140  Unless the corpora-
tion’s articles or bylaws state otherwise, the presiding officer determines the 
order of business and has the authority to establish rules for the conduct of 
the meeting.141  Generally, the order of business, rules for the conduct of a 
meeting and any action by the presiding officer must be reasonable, fair to 
all shareholders and may not favor or disadvantage the proponent of any 
action at the meeting.142  Finally, the presiding officer may announce at the 
meeting when the polls close for each matter voted upon.143  If no 
announcement is made, the polls close upon the final adjournment of the 
meeting.144 
 
that would be outstanding after giving effect to the conversion of convertible shares and other 
securities and the exercise of rights to be issued.  Id. § 10-35-17(3)(a)(1)-(2).  Additionally, a 
series of transactions is integrated if consummation of one transaction is made contingent on 
consummation of one or more of the other transactions.  Id. § 10-35-17(3)(b). 
137. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(f) (2008). 
138. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual Rule 312.03; American Stock 
Exchange Company Guide Rule 712(b); NASDAQ Stock Market Rule 4310(c)(25)(H)(i).  Section 
6.21(f) of the Model Act is generally patterned on New York Stock Exchange Listed Company 
Manual Rule 312.03, American Stock Exchange Company Guide Rule 712(b) and NASDAQ 
Stock Market Rule 4310(c)(25)(H)(i).  Corporations should look to comments on Section 6.21(f) 
of the Model Act for illustrations of the 20% requirement.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(f) 
comments. 
139. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-19; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.08. 
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-19(1).  The presiding officer must be appointed in the 
manner provided in the articles or bylaws or, in the absence of such a provision, by the board 
before the meeting or by the shareholders at the meeting.  Id.  If the articles or bylaws are silent on 
the appointment of a presiding officer and the board and the shareholders fail to designate a 
presiding officer, the president is the presiding officer.  Id. 
141. Id. § 10-35-19(2). 
142. Id. § 10-35-19(3). 
143. Id. § 10-35-19(4). 
144. Id. (Except as provided in § 10-35-09(1)). 
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N. SECTION 10-35-20:  ACTION BY SHAREHOLDERS WITHOUT A 
MEETING 
Section 10-35-20 reverses the rule in NDBCA Section 10-19.1-75, 
which permits shareholders to act by majority consent without a meeting, 
but only if the articles authorize them to do so.145  Under the Act, action 
taken by majority consent is always available.146  Section 10-35-20(2) pro-
vides that action may not be taken by ballot without a meeting.147  This 
reverses NDBCA section 10-19.1-75.1, which permits action by ballot 
without a meeting unless the articles or bylaws provide otherwise.148 
O. POISON PILLS AND ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS 
The term “Poison Pill” was originally coined as a pejorative term for an 
effective antitakeover device developed during the 1980s.149  The Act does 
not prohibit the adoption of all poison pills as experience has shown poison 
pills can be used to benefit shareholders by preventing a corporation from 
being sold at an inadequate price.150  However, the Act places limitations on 
the use of poison pills to prevent them from being used to entrench 
incumbent management.151 
1. Section 10-35-22:  Duration of Poison Pills Limited 
Section 10-35-22(1) prohibits a poison pill adopted by the board and 
not approved by the shareholders from being in effect for longer than the 
shorter of (i) one year or (ii) ninety days after a majority of shareholders 
have voted to accept an offer for the sale of the corporation.152  The ninety-
day period is based on the practice of the Ontario Securities Commission, 
which requires the withdrawal of a poison pill under those circumstances.153  
 
145. Id. § 10-19.1-75 (1985). 
146. Id. § 10-35-20(1) (2007). 
147. Id. § 10-35-20(2). 
148. Id. § 10-19.1-75.1 (1985). 
149. Walter Hamilton, Gemstar Wields ‘80s Weapon: Poison Pill Takeover Defense, L.A. 
TIMES, July 16, 1998, at D-1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jul/16/business/fi-4149.  
The more formal reference to a poison pill is “shareholder rights plan.”  Id.  The definition of 
“poison pill” in North Dakota Century Code section 10-35-2 is patterned in part after 
Pennsylvania’s statute.  See 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2513 (2000). 
150. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-22(2), -26 (2007). 
151. See discussion infra Part III.O.2 (explaining the poison pill limits). 
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-22(1). 
153. See National Policy 62-202, Ontario Securities Commission (stating “[t]he primary 
objective of the take-over bid provisions of Canadian securities legislation is the protection of the 
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However, under Section 10-35-22(2) of the Act, a poison pill approved by 
the shareholders is subject to a longer time limit of the shorter of (i) two 
years or (ii) ninety days after a majority of the shareholders have indicated 
that they wish to accept an offer for the sale of the corporation.154  Addi-
tionally, under Section 10-35-22(3), corporations may not adopt, create, or 
issue a poison pill without the approval of its shareholders until it has held a 
regular shareholder meeting, after its most recent prior poison pill has 
expired or been redeemed.155  These provisions ensure that the board cannot 
maintain a poison pill indefinitely without the approval of shareholders at a 
regular meeting. 
2. Section 10-35-23:  Protection of Power of Current Directors 
Over Poison Pill 
Section 10-35-23 prohibits the inclusion of provisions that limit in any 
way the power of the board of directors, as it may be constituted at any 
point in time, to take action with respect to a poison pill.156  Such provisions 
are commonly referred to as “dead hand” or “slow hand” pills.157  Under 
these provisions, only directors in office before an offer is made for the 
corporation (or successors that those directors approve) may redeem or 
 
bona fide interests of the shareholders of the target company.  A secondary objective is to provide 
a regulatory framework within which take-over bids may proceed in an open and even-handed 
environment.  The take-over bid provisions should favour neither the offeror nor the management 
of the target company, and should leave the shareholders of the target company free to make a 
fully informed decision.  The Canadian securities regulatory authorities are concerned that certain 
defensive measures taken by management of a target company may have the effect of denying to 
shareholders the ability to make such a decision and of frustrating an open take-over bid 
process."); Re Canadian Jorex Ltd. (1992), 15 O.S.C.B. 257 (finding that "there comes a time 
when the pill has to go"); Re Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust and Canadian Income 
Properties Real Estate Investment Trust (1999) 22 O.S.C.B. 7819 (stating “[w]e recognize that the 
board of a target company facing a hostile bid may adopt defensive tactics in a genuine attempt to 
increase shareholder value.  However, we also confirm that we will step in if their tactics appear 
likely to deny or severely limit the opportunity of the shareholders to respond to the bid.”). 
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-22(2). 
155. Id. § 10-35-22(3).  The date of the regular meeting of shareholders must: 
(a) [c]omply with section 10-35-12; (b) be at least ninety days after the date on which 
the prior poison pill expired, was redeemed, or otherwise ceased to be of any force or 
effect; and (c) if the corporation has an advance notice requirement adopted pursuant 
to section 10-35-07, give the shareholders the full period of time required by [section 
10-35-07(4)] in which to provide notice to the corporation of an intention to nominate 
candidates for election at the meeting. 
Id. 
156. Id. § 10-35-23. 
157. A “dead hand” poison pill is one that states that only the original directors who put the 
provision into place can dismantle the pill, so any new directors are prevented from interfering.  A 
“slow hand” poison pill is when this “dead hand” provision is of a limited duration. 
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otherwise disable the poison pill.  The prohibition of “dead hand” provi-
sions in the Act is consistent with Delaware case law.158 
3. Section 10-35-26:  Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions 
Section 10-35-26(1) requires any antitakeover provision included in the 
articles or bylaws of a corporation, subject to the Act, to be approved by at 
least a two-thirds vote of the shareholders.159  Section 10-35-26(2) defines 
an antitakeover provision as a provision that blocks an acquisition by any 
person or group of persons or blocks a change in control of the corporation 
absent compliance with the provision.160  Requiring a two-thirds vote is 
particularly important in the current troubled market as threat of hostile or 
unsolicited takeovers increase.161 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE PARADIGM SHIFT 
Each of the changes discussed in Part III is important in its own right as 
a protection of shareholder influence over corporate governance.162  The 
true significance of the Act, however, becomes clear when these sections 
are considered together.  The combination of rights provided by the Act will 
create true accountability of directors to the shareholders.  Under the Act, 
 
158. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Del. 1998) (“we 
hold that the Delayed Redemption Provision is invalid under [8 Del. C. §] 141(a), which confers 
upon any newly elected board of directors full power to manage and direct the business and affairs 
of a Delaware corporation”); Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1194 (Del. Ch. 
1998) (discussing whether the “dead hand” provision was an unreasonable defensive measure and 
concluding it was). 
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-26(1). 
160. Id. § 10-35-26(2).  An antitakover provision under Section 10-35-26(2) is also any 
provision that, upon acquisition or change of control (1) restricts the terms, limits the price or 
alters how the transaction must be approved by the directors or shareholders; (2) requires an 
approval of the directors or shareholders in addition to, or in a different manner from, the relevant 
approvals required under the Act and the NDBCA; (3) requires the approval of a nongovernmental 
third party; (4) requires the corporation, directly or indirectly, to take an action that it would not 
have been required to otherwise take; (5) limits, directly or indirectly, the power of the corporation 
to take an action that the corporation would have had the power to take; (6) changes or limits the 
voting rights of any shares of the corporation; (7) gives any shareholder of the corporation a direct 
right of action against a person or group of persons with respect to the acquisition or control of the 
corporation; or (8) is designed or intended to operate as what is commonly referred to as a 
“business combination,” “control share acquisition,” “control share cash out,” “freeze out,” “fair 
price,” “disgorgement,” or other “antitakeover” provision.  The term “antitakeover provision” 
does not include a provision if the shares are issuable upon the exercise of a poison pill or where 
the provision serves to protect dividend, interest, sinking fund, conversion, exchange, or other 
rights of the shares, or to protect against the issuance of additional securities that would be on a 
parity with or superior to the shares.  Id. 
161. DAVID A. KATZ & LAURA A MCINTOSH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UPDATE: 
SHAREHOLDERS FOCUSED ON STABILITY IN PROXY VOTES 5 (2008), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/files/2008/11/shareholders-focused-on-stability-in-proxy-votes.pdf. 
162. See discussion supra Part II. 
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directors know they will be held accountable each year for their stewardship 
of the corporation because the shareholders are empowered, logistically and 
financially, to vote them out if dissatisfied.163  By emphasizing to directors 
that shareholders have the actual, rather than just theoretical ability to 
change the composition of the board, the Act should focus directors in a 
new way on how they are performing. 
Opponents of the reforms in the Act fear that giving shareholders the 
rights provided by the Act will create chaos with unknowledgeable 
shareholders meddling in the day-to-day activities of the corporation.164  
Proponents of the reforms in the Act, in contrast, believe that the Act will 
not have this effect.165  Directors will be aware in a new and more direct 
way of the importance of their stewardship over the corporation, and in-
stances of directorial misconduct should diminish.  There will be less need 
for proxy contests because directors will be more in tune with their share-
holder constituency.  There will also be less need for litigation and review 
of director actions after the fact, because shareholders will be able to 
intervene and refocus the board before problems requiring judicial oversight 
arise.  Ultimately, the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act is a 
paradigm shift in corporate governance. 
 
 
163. See discussion supra Parts III.B-C, III.E, III.H (exploring the various aspects of director 
accountability to shareholder under the Act). 
164. E.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Towards a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response 
to Lucian’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2006); 
Lewis J. Sundquist III, Proposal to Allow Shareholder Nomination of Corporate Directors: 
Overreaction in Times of Corporate Scandal, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1471, 1474 (2004); 
Kevin L. Turner, Settling the Debate: a Response to Professor Bebchuk’s Proposed Reform of 
Hostile Takeover Defenses, 57 ALA. L. REV. 907, 907 (2006). 
165. E.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 7, passim; Cary, supra note 7, passim; Increasing Share-
holder Power, supra note 19, passim; McCahery, supra note 7, passim; Myth of the Shareholder 
Franchise, supra note 19, passim. 
